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 Capability Coordination in Modular Organization: Voluntary 
FS/OSS Production and the Case of Debian GNU/Linux  
Abstract 
The paper analyzes voluntary Free Software/Open Source Software (FS/OSS) 
organization of work. The empirical setting considered is the Debian GNU/Linux 
operating system. The paper finds that the production process is hierarchical 
notwithstanding the modular (nearly decomposable) architecture of software and of 
voluntary FS/OSS organization. But voluntary FS/OSS project organization is not 
hierarchical for the same reasons suggested by the most familiar theories of 
economic organization: hierarchy is justified for coordination of continuous change, 
rather than for the direction of static production. Hierarchy is ultimately the 
overhead attached to the benefits engendered by modular organization. 
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1 / Introduction 
Many are accustomed to the idea that software is a product just like any other: 
it is purchased and it cannot be modified according to need. In short, software 
is perceived to be a closed system like a home appliance, such as a toaster, 
microwave oven or dishwasher. The challenge to this traditional idea is Free 
Software/Open Source Software (FS/OSS). Unlike proprietary software, 
FS/OSS is (often) distributed free of charge and, most importantly, entails the 
free/open access to the source code for purposes of study or modification. The 
fact that FS/OSS can be modified or studied by anyone who has the interest 
and the ability to do so has spawned a large community of programmers 
sharing not only FS/OSS, but also the capabilities to do so.1 
  We discuss FS/OSS from the organizational standpoint. Previous 
organizational contributions (Benkler 2002; Garzarelli 2004) built on a Coase 
Theorem-like argument (Coase 1960). They emphasized that for FS/OSS 
altruistic motivation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for its 
voluntary organization. Their basic conclusion was that the raison d’être and 
stability of FS/OSS organization of work can be ascribed to the sharing of a 
common capability base among software programmers. 
  The present essay intends to extend these previous efforts by focusing 
on the coordination of work under a specific FS/OSS production regime: the 
                                                 
1 Capabilities refer to “the knowledge, experience, and skills” of an organization (Richardson 1972, p. 
888). See also, inter alia, Chandler (1992), Langlois (1992, 1995, 1998, 2002) and Langlois and Robertson 
(1995). 
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voluntary one. In many cases FS/OSS programmers are in fact volunteers: their 
work on some FS/OSS project is without remuneration, and it is not usually 
imposed from above, as in a typical top-down managerial hierarchy. The 
empirical setting considered is the Debian GNU/Linux operating system.2 
  Contrary to our expectations, we find that the production process of 
Debian is hierarchical notwithstanding the modular architecture of software 
and of voluntary FS/OSS organization.3 In our story, however, the hierarchy 
rationale of FS/OSS organization is not coextensive with that of more familiar 
theories of economic organization: hierarchy is justified for coordination of 
continuously generated change, rather than for the direction of a steady 
(predictable) flow of production. The supplementary benefits that a voluntary 
FS/OSS production regime yields are, all things considered, not a free lunch, 
or, rather, a free beer4: hierarchy, we shall argue, is the overhead of modular 
organization. 
  But perhaps the most succinct way to convey our argument is in terms 
of externalities (cf. Langlois 2002). In voluntary FS/OSS production, hierarchy 
primarily exists to internalize the externalities that the organization of 
                                                 
2 GNU is a recursive acronym that stands for “GNU’s Not UNIX”; it is pronounced “guh-NEW” 
(‹http://www.gnu.org/›). 
3 Note that in this work we consider modularity to be tantamount to near decomposability (Simon 
1998[1962]). That is, we have in mind a system composed of different modules the interactions among 
which – although tending to zero in the limit – have a nonnegligible effect on the system as a whole. This 
implies that not all modular systems are perfectly decomposable. In turn, to Simon this meant that near 
decomposability practically implies hierarchy ex hypothesi. We shall reach the same destination by a 
somewhat different trail. See also Alexander (1964) and the more recent Brusoni and Prencipe (2001) and 
Langlois (2002). 
4 “‘Free software’ is a matter of liberty, not price. To understand the concept, you should think of ‘free’ as 
in ‘free speech,’ not as in ‘free beer’”‹http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html›. 
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production  innately  generates. More precisely, hierarchy is necessary to 
coordinate those Pareto-relevant externalities triggered by the gains from trade 
among self-selected programmers.5 
2 / Background 
When we think about software we usually think in terms of “programs,” that 
is, applications (word processors, browsers, mail-clients, and so on) that we can 
run on our computer to get a variety of tasks done. And yet, it must be 
emphasized that in these cases we use programs only in their executable binary 
form (object code), i.e., a machine language that the computer is able to read 
and process. Programs are in fact written in different computer programming 
languages (BASIC, C, Java, etc.) that are readable to humans. When programs 
are in their human-readable form they are called source code. Other types of 
programs, called interpreters and compilers, are used to translate the source 
code into its executable form. When programs are in their executable form, all 
users can exploit their various functions. 
  We may divide programs into two types: proprietary and FS/OSS. If a 
program is proprietary its license agreement doesn’t permit anyone to copy, 
distribute, or modify it. In addition, most of the times the source code is not 
                                                 
5 An externality caused by a party that generates the will on behalf of another (benefited or damaged) 
party to directly take action through exchange, agreement, compromise, bargaining, collective action and 
the like in order to internalize it is known as Pareto-relevant. An externality that does not generate such 
will is Pareto-irrelevant (Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962, esp. pp. 373-4). 
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even available for mere reading or studying. There even exist cases where 
proprietary licenses prohibit some uses for a program. One such case is that of 
Bitkeeper from Bitmover, Inc. Bitkeeper is a version management tool the 
license of which does not permit its use to individuals who are involved in 
developing or selling products with similar features.6 
  On the other hand, FS/OSS programs are covered by free software or 
open source licensing schemes. These licensing schemes specify that the source 
code is available, can be freely copied, modified, and distributed. Accordingly, 
the word “free” does not always mean gratis: the word is derived from 
freedom – hence, free/open access to program code. Many companies in fact 
sell FS/OSS for profit worldwide. For example, MySQL AB is a company 
founded in Sweden (now having several offices worldwide) that sells the 
FS/OSS MySQL database. 
  FS/OSS licensing schemes may (at this stage) be distinguished into two 
broad categories: Copyleft and non-Copyleft. A Copyleft license works this 
way: if modified versions of or works derived from programs protected under 
Copyleft are distributed, they must be relicensed under the same license. This 
is sometimes referred to as persistence of license. For example, GNU General 
                                                 
6 Section 3 (Licensee Obligations), paragraph (d), of the BitKeeper License version Sep-16-2002 states: 
“Notwithstanding any other terms in this License, this License is not available to You if You and/or your 
employer develop, produce, sell, and/or resell a product which contains substantially similar capabilities 
of   the BitKeeper Software, or, in the reasonable opinion of BitMover, competes with the BitKeeper 
Software”  ‹http://www.bitkeeper.com/Sales.Licensing.Free.html›. The quote from this link is from 
October 28, 2003; on November 8, 2003 the link was still there, but not the BitKeeper License. In order to 
view the very last version of the license agreement the Bitkeeper site suggests to run a command from the 
installation; an older version of the license (BitKeeper License version 1.40, 08/23/02) can be found at 
‹http://www.bitkeeper.com/bkl.txt›. 
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Public License (GNU GPL) (‹http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html›), the most 
famous and used FS/OSS license, is copyleft. Non-Copyleft licenses might be 
modified and distributed as well, but it’s possible to add additional restrictions 
to their use (e.g., software under an Apache license 
‹http://www.apache.org/LICENSE.txt› that can be rendered proprietary). 
  For analytical purposes we are placing Free Software and Open Source 
Software under a common rubric. And the two software movements do to a 
large extent factually share the same rights. But there are some crucial 
differences. 
  One dimension of difference is motive (compare Wheeler n.d.1). The 
Free Software Foundation (FSF) (‹http://www.gnu.org›) emphasizes the 
possibility of using and sharing software independently from the control of 
others, where the objective is not technological but social 
(‹http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html›). To quote a FSF brochure 
(n.d., p. 1), “[m]ost software projects aim to make better technology. The GNU 
project [‹http://www.gnu.org›] has a higher goal: to make a better society.” 
  The Open Source Initiative (OSI) (‹http://www.opensource.org›) 
conversely emphasizes a technological objective. It is claimed that if you adopt 
a license scheme that falls within the Open Source Definition 
(‹http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php›) the output will be 
software that is allegedly of higher “quality.” This “efficiency” motivation is 
used to stress the commercial viability of OSS 
(‹http://www.opensource.org/index.php›). 
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  And yet, it must be highlighted that there have been licenses that were 
OSS but not FS. (So far, there have been no examples of the opposite.) For 
instance, the original Artistic License (‹http://www.gnu.org/licenses/license-
list.html#NonFreeSoftwareLicense›) was not considered a free software 
license, but an open source one (‹http://www.opensource.org/licenses/artistic-
license.php›); Artistic License 2.0 corrected this 
(‹http://dev.perl.org/perl6/rfc/346.html›). Similarly, in its early releases, the 
Apple Public Software License (APSL) was approved by the OSI 
(‹http://opensource.org/licenses/apsl.php›), but rejected by FSF 
(‹http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/historical-apsl.html›). Starting with version 
2.0, however, FSF endorses APSL as well 
(‹http://www.opensource.apple.com/news/2.0-announce.html›). 
Note, however, that in the vast majority of cases a license that meets the 
OSI’s open source definition also meets the FSF’s free software definition. In 
particular, the most common FS/OSS licenses are both FS and OSS: GPL, 
Lesser GPL (LGPL), MIT/X and BSD-new (Wheeler 2003; Wheeler n.d.2). 
  FS/OSS is clearly a complex phenomenon. As such, it is gaining 
attention. This is true not only in the general domain of academic research,7 but 
also in the policy and business domains. 
  For instance, in October 2000 the United States President’s Information 
Technology Information Committee recommended that “the Federal 
                                                 
7 See, inter alia, Peyrache et al. (2000), Kuan (2001), Benkler (2002), Feller and Fitzgerald (2002), Lerner 
and Tirole (2002), Garzarelli (2004), and von Hippel and von Krogh (2003). 
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government should aggressively encourage the development of open source 
software for high end computing” (‹http://www.itrd.gov/pubs/pitac/pres-oss-
11sep00.pdf›). Furthermore, the United States Army and the Defense 
Information Systems Agency have commissioned the MITRE Corporation to 
produce a business case study (2001) and a report (2003) about FS/OSS.8 The 
report, in particular, explored the feasibility of adopting FS/OSS solutions for 
Department of Defense (DoD) organizations, but found that much FS/OSS 
already plays an important role in the general functioning of the DoD. 
Therefore, the report continues, attempting to remove FS/OSS from current 
DoD infrastructure would be counterproductive; and, all things considered, it 
would be more productive to increase its use in some cases. 
  Other governments are also giving FS/OSS serious consideration. The 
Center of Open Source and Government for example supports the so-called 
South African Proposed Strategy for Using Open Source Software in the South 
African Government (‹http://www.oss.gov.za/docs/OSS_Strategy_v3.pdf›). 
“While government procurement policy should be neutral to ensure that 
governments do not introduce market distortions into the world economy,” 
writes the Center, “there should be an appreciation of the social benefits of 
fostering Open Source software development in a proper Open Source 
Government Policy plan.” 
(‹http://www.egovos.org/SouthAfricanStrategy.html›). Similarly, the daily 
                                                 
8 ‹ http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_01/kenwood_software/index.html› and 
‹http://www.egovos.org/pdf/dodfoss.pdf›. 
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press often informs about how Germany, Japan, South Korea and China have 
shifted (or are interested in shifting) their public administration toward 
FS/OSS. 
  The European Union (EU) is also studying FS/OSS (FLOSS Final 
Report 2002). It is organizing (and has organized) several types of conferences 
and workshops to explore the FS/OSS phenomenon, and its viability for EU 
administrative governance, not only for the bureaucratic sphere but also for the 
“more democratic sphere,” for narrowing the gap between citizens and various 
levels of government (so-called e-government). (Visit for example 
‹http://www.prelude-portal.org/3roses/index.php›, and various links therein.)  
    Some hardware producers, moreover, are still rather optimistic about 
FS/OSS solutions for personal computers notwithstanding early 
disappointments. The Times of India has published an article on June 2, 2003 
revealing that IBM will launch India’s first Linux certified PC, the NetVista A30 
model, at the cost of about 850 US dollars.9 
  What about Microsoft Corporation? After evaluating the potential 
competition from FS/OSS (‹http://www.opensource.org/halloween›), it 
decided to introduce “Shared Source” in 2001. Shared Source is a class of 
licenses that partially replicates some of the rights of FS/OSS. It allows those 
who are entitled to participate in the Shared Source program to inspect the 
                                                 
9 ‹http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/xml/uncomp/articleshow?msid=2218›. 
8  
source code and to perform debugging operations.10 Yet, the user cannot 
modify, redistribute or commercialize Shared Source – the intellectual property 
rights remain Microsoft’s. In brief, Shared Source keeps all traditional 
proprietary characteristics.11 
  At the same time, however, Microsoft is a consumer of FS/OSS. 
Windows and Office, which are key Microsoft products, include non-
copylefted FS/OSS components. For example, Windows incorporates many 
FS/OSS components that implement Internet components (primarily from the 
BSD Unix-like operating systems); and, as the 2003 MITRE report also notes (p. 
22), Office includes the FS/OSS zlib (‹http://www.gzip.org/zlib/›) compression 
software. In addition, Microsoft sells FS/OSS bundled to its proprietary one: 
“Windows Services for Unix” contains software licensed under GPL (such as 
the GNU compiler gcc). Clearly, Microsoft recognizes some “value” in 
FS/OSS.12 However, at this time Microsoft does not sell entirely FS/OSS 
products to consumers. 
  The statistics certainly justify all this attention to FS/OSS. For example, 
just in the last week of October 2003 more than 3 million FS/OSS packages 
have been downloaded from SourceForge alone 
(‹http://www.sourceforge.net/›). At the same time, Netcraft reports that if one 
                                                 
10 See ‹http://www.microsoft.com/resources/sharedsource/licensing/default.mspx› and 
‹http://www.microsoft.com/resources/sharedsource/Initiative/Initiative.mspx›, respectively. 
11 See for example ‹http://www.antifork.org/opensource/advocacy/shared_source.php›. 
12 Something in sharp contrast to Microsoft’s attack on GNU GPL and LGPL licenses with its “Royalty-
Free CIFS Technical Reference License Agreement.” See ‹http://www.gnu.org/press/2002-04-11-ms-
patent.html›. 
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considers the trend in top developers, we see that from October 2003 to 
November 2003 Microsoft, SunONE and Zeus experienced a total loss of 2.58 
percent (that translates into a net loss of 11,717,993 sites) to Apache 
(‹http://news.netcraft.com/›).13 
  Before proceeding, allow us moreover to note that FS/OSS is not at all a 
recent phenomenon. The origins of FS/OSS go back to the beginning of 
electronic computing, and its diffusion was promulgated by the so-called 
hacker culture. Hackers are very creative software developers who believe in 
the unconditional sharing of software code and in mutual help (Raymond 2001, 
pp. 1-17; 169-91). Apparently, the sharing ethos began mostly because the early 
computer users were also programmers. Computing writ large was in fact a 
fairly restricted activity, and many of the first computers included the source 
code. As a result, the few computer users shared information and programs. 
This changed in the 1950s and 1960s when IBM introduced the 360 system – a 
system that was proprietary not only in hardware but also in software.14 As a 
consequence, software too became a source of profit. But since around the mid-
seventies (thanks to the introduction of the MITS/Altair computer, the first 
true minicomputer) there has been a growing interest in the original sharing 
philosophy in parallel with the unprecedented diffusion of proprietary 
software (cf. Langlois 1992). 
                                                 
13 For more figures on FS/OSS, see Wheeler (2003). 
14 Which eventually led to United States v. International Business Machines Corporation 1956, Trade Case No. 
68, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
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  Yet, it is thanks to the capillary diffusion of the Internet that in recent 
years we have growth in the number of interactions among FS/OSS 
programmers as well as in the popularity of FS/OSS. Further, many programs 
on which the Internet runs are FS/OSS: for example BIND (translating a 
domain name into a corresponding IP address), SendMail (the most used mail 
system), and Apache (the most popular web server). 
3 / Voluntary Modular Organization and Debian GNU/Linux 
The production model of FS/OSS can be idealtypically classified into three 
basic organizational “categories.” 
•  Corporate. 
•  Hybrid. 
•  Voluntary. 
  The FS/OSS projects falling under the corporate category do not seem to 
have organizational attributes different from traditional proprietary projects. 
Indeed, the organization of work followed seems to be the same as that of a 
traditional firm. There is a well-defined hierarchy for the production process: 
there are a project manager, analysts, programmers, and end-users that within 
an organization are employed to – respectively – direct production and define, 
produce, and use the system. All stages of production are carried out by 
internal organization. 
11  
  In a recent study, Henkel (2003) focuses on the corporate FS/OSS 
production process. One of his concrete illustrations is “Openadaptor” 
software. Designed and developed by the investment bank Dresdner Kleinwort 
Wasserstein in London, Openadaptor is a middleware platform to help the 
cooperation of trading and e-business systems. 
  The difference between the voluntary and the hybrid idealtypes is not 
often considered. In the voluntary case the process of production is open for all 
contributors: deadlines and tasks may be assigned by the organization, but 
programmers are not completely bound to follow them. 
  In the hybrid case, volunteers from outside the organization as well as 
remunerated programmers contribute to the production process. The tasks and 
timeline are set by the organization and are binding for the remunerated 
programmers. When the volunteers do not respect deadlines or assignment of 
task, the remunerated programmers will. And when there are urgent 
necessities for, e.g., a patch, the hybrid organization may work in house even if 
this means duplication of volunteer efforts from outside. The American 
company Red Hat Enterprise is a good example of a hybrid. Red Hat produces 
a distribution of the GNU/Linux operating system, which it not only freely 
distributes on the web but also sells, as off-the-shelf packages, with manuals 
and limited warranty as add-ons. 
  The Debian Project (‹http://www.debian.org›) is an association of 
volunteers who cooperate to create a free/open operating system, named 
12  
Debian GNU/Linux. Ian A. Murdock started the Debian project in August 
1993, while still an undergraduate at Purdue University. 
  The raison d’être of the Project is not one of profit.15 Even if Debian has 
expenses, such as registering the debian.org domain or reimbursing travel 
expenses for conferences, only donations are welcome; and donated funds are 
not used, e.g., to pay for development of software or for production of 
documentation. If anything, the objective function that Debian organization 
tries to maximize is the one that later became typical of the OSS slogan, namely, 
product quality.16 
  To get involved in the project volunteers are required to “abide” to the 
Debian Social Contract (‹http://www.debian.org/social_contract›) as well as to 
the Debian Free Software Guidelines (aka, DFSG) 
(‹http://www.debian.org/social_contract#guidelines›).17 More specifically, to 
join the Debian project, an applicant (a potential contributor), needs to follow 
“The Debian New Maintainer Process”: “a series of required proceedings to 
become a Debian developer” (‹http://www.debian.org/devel/join/newmaint›). 
                                                 
15 “Debian motivated the formation of Software In The Public Interest, Inc., a New York-based non-
profit organization. SPI is a non-profit organization which was founded to help Debian and other similar 
organizations develop and distribute open hardware and software. Among other things, SPI provides a 
mechanism by which The Debian Project may accept contributions that are tax [deductible] in the United 
States” (‹http://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/project-history/ch-intro.en.html›). 
16 The “focus [is] on providing a first-class product and not on profits or returns, and the margin from the 
products and services provided may be used to improve the software itself for all users whether they paid 
to obtain it or not” (‹http://info.astrian.net/doc/debian-history/html/apA.html›). 
17 From which derives the previously mentioned Open Source Definition. The Debian Free Software 
Guidelines, which are also part of the Social Contract, define the scope of the software licenses that can be 
accepted for Debian packages. Indeed, there is no specific license for Debian other than the licenses in the 
various software packages that make up the distribution 
(‹http://www.debian.org/social_contract#guidelines›). 
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Through this process the applicant is identified, is required to understand and 
share the philosophy of Debian, and, along with the Application Manager (a 
mentor), the “applicant must [also] provide assurance that [he or she] can, in 
fact, do the job for which [he or she has] volunteered” 
(‹http://www.debian.org/devel/join/nm-step4›). 
  “The document of utmost importance to the organization” 
(‹http://www.debian.org/devel/›) of Debian is, however, the Debian 
Constitution (‹http://www.debian.org/devel/constitution.en.html›). The 
Constitution establishes a hierarchy. That is, within the Debian Project there are 
de jure different roles, e.g., the Project Leader, the Technical Committee, and 
the Developers. 
  In the Debian hierarchy, the role of ultimate coordinator lies with the 
Project Leader. For example, the Leader helps define the project’s vision, lends 
authority to Developers and makes any decision that requires urgent action. 
The Leader also represents Debian outside the Project (e.g., goes to conferences 
and gives talks). All Debian Developers can vote to elect the Leader, and a 
Leader’s mandate lasts one year.18 
  The charge of the Technical Committee – composed of a minimum of 4 
and a maximum 8 members – is akin to that of a judging body. The Technical 
Committee has authority over solving divergences about such issues as the 
                                                 
18 Besides the Constitution, on the Leader see also ‹http://www.debian.org/devel/leader›. What is also 
interesting in this FS/OSS organization of work is that although Individual Developers are at the bottom 
of the hierarchy, they can, as a Body, override a decision taken by a superior (such as the Project Leader or 
Technical Committee) by way of a General Resolution (where a Resolution is a voting procedure to 
rediscuss technical and nontechnical issues) or of an election. 
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contents of a reference manual or ownership of a command name. Yet, it may 
also make formal statements about its opinion on any matter. 
  The Constitution doesn’t impose any obligation on anyone to work 
continuously on the Project; in fact, a contributor can leave the project at any 
time or resign from his or her position or duty by a simple announcement. 
There is no termination of a formal employment contract as in a firm.19 It may 
be noted in this context that whereas in a firm one usually resigns for the 
possibility of better remuneration elsewhere, in this case one usually resigns for 
reasons of loss of interest or of lack of time.20 
  More interesting, perhaps, is the related issue of assignment of duty 
once an applicant has been accepted into Debian. The duty is in fact decided in 
conjunction with the Application Manager (i.e., the mentor) based on the 
capability of the applicant: the process explicitly acknowledges the dispersion 
of capabilities, favoring self-selection. “The Application Manager will work out 
with the applicant just which tasks the applicant wishes to volunteer to 
                                                 
19 Recall the Simonian formal theory of the employment relationship. The employer pays a wage to the 
employee that grants her the right to choose which action a  ∈  A the employee will be instructed to 
perform, where A is the set of actions the employee consents to – the so-called zone of indifference or zone 
of acceptance (Simon 1951). Accordingly, in a firm the employee is always in a situation of subordination 
(for reasons of remuneration) in that, unlike the market, the ultimate decision rights are alien to him. In 
voluntary FS/OSS organization such as Debian, authority figures like a Project Leader are granted 
privileges from reputation, rather than rights by formal contracts (e.g., Garzarelli 2004). In some cases, 
some reputation privileges may stay even after such figures exit a project. One case of this is that of 
Richard M. Stallman and GCC (GNU C Collection – was GNU C Compiler). GCC was originally written 
by Stallman; currently, Stallman is not even listed in the GCC Steering Committee (founded in 1998), but 
he is still recognized as the father of the Project. Visit ‹http://gcc.gnu.org/›. 
20 Strictly speaking, the flip side, i.e., the de jure invitation to leave (being dismissed) is contemplated, but 
it is de facto never implemented on the basis of technical reasons. It could be implemented for what we 
may call behavioral reasons (called Debian Machine Usage Policies): for example, using the email address 
of the association for personal and not for job-related reasons. This is clearly stated in 
‹http://www.debian.org/devel/dmup›. 
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perform” (from step 4 of the Debian New Maintainer process 
‹http://www.debian.org/devel/join/nm-step4›). 
  The history of Debian, which also describes the purposes of the project, 
sheds some light on matters organizational as well 
(‹http://info.astrian.net/doc/debian-history/html/index.html#abstract›) – 
especially its appendix A, the so-called Debian Linux Manifesto, written on 6 
January, 1994 by Debian founder Murdock (last revised 29 December, 1999). 
During 1994, when Debian was already to the 0.91 version of the system, it was 
decided to devote some efforts to organize the Debian Project, since there were 
already people involved and organization was becoming an issue (Murdock 
was still putting together the releases by himself at that stage (!), see 
‹http://info.astrian.net/doc/debian-history/html/ch4.html›). The following 
excerpt makes clear the motivation behind Debian’s free/open organization. 
By involving others with a wide range of abilities and backgrounds, 
Debian is able to be developed in a modular fashion. Its components 
are of high quality because those with expertise in a certain area are 
given the opportunity to construct or maintain the individual 
components of Debian involving that area. Involving others also 
ensures that valuable suggestions for improvement can be 
incorporated into the distribution during its development; thus, a 
distribution is created based on the needs and wants of the users 
rather than the needs and wants of the constructor. It is very 
difficult for one individual or small group to anticipate these needs 
and wants in advance without direct input from others 
(‹http://info.astrian.net/doc/debian-history/html/apA.html›). 
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  So, the free/open structure of Debian organization draws its rationale 
from the (typically Hayekian21) belief that specific productive knowledge is not 
held in its entirety by a single mind. But rather than seeing the capability 
dispersion problem as a constraint, as is often the case (or, rather, the rule), the 
Debian philosophy of production sees it as an opportunity: it exploits 
dispersed capability to its advantage by letting productive knowledge search 
its organization, rather than vice versa. 
  But let us be clear at this juncture about what “free/open” means to 
Debian. The self-selection mechanism is composed of the following ingredients: 
spare time, some technical knowledge, and an interest in the project; but the 
New Maintainer process (‹http://www.debian.org/devel/join/newmaint›) and 
the Constitution prevent the participation of unskilled or bothersome 
participants. Debian hence holds the ultimate right to select which capabilities 
should join its mission. 
  As is usually the case, however, there is more to organization than what 
is spelled out in its statute or chronicled in its official history. Next to the 
formal Debian hierarchy there exists the informal one. As is the case in 
professions and academia,22 reputation plays a fundamental role in the FS/OSS 
world, and Debian is no exception. In actual fact, the positive and negative 
externalities deriving from reputation often have precedence over formal 
                                                 
21 Hayek (1945, Chs. 2 and 4) and cf. Raymond (2001). 
22 In fact, organizations sharing similar characteristics are the professions (Savage and Robertson 1999; 
Garzarelli 2004) and in open science (David, e.g., 1998). 
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hierarchy. It is possible for someone with no formal authority to have authority 
over others because of positive reputation; and it is possible for someone 
having formal authority over others to lose it because of negative reputation. 
Bdale Garbee, a former Debian Project Leader and continuing member of the 
Technical Committee, put it this way in a recent email (25 July, 2003) to one of 
the authors. 
I believe the hierarchy of ‘authorities’ who have the ability to hasten 
the selection or rejection of changes that may have broad impact is 
only vaguely related to the visible hierarchy of people with titles in 
the project. While in theory the Technical Committee, for example, 
holds a lot of responsibility, in practice almost every major change 
that I can remember was shepherded along by one or two key 
contributors in that area of the Project who were generally accepted 
as ‘masters’ of that problem domain in the project, often without 
having any particular title in the organization. 
So, in some sense, I believe that it may be accurate to describe a 
hierarchy of technical authority in a project like Debian, but it may 
not be a visible hierarchy, or the specific visible hierarchy that 
someone on the outside of the project would ‘naturally’ assume. 
In practice, this means that leadership (which translates directly into formal 
and informal hierarchy and authority) is not just established in bureaucratic or 
rational fashion, but in charismatic fashion as well (Weber 1964[1947], pp. 
358ff.); here, charismatic authority mostly derives from earned respect often 
proven by leading a big, successful project. As a matter of fact, charismatic 
authority may be, in some circumstances, more “efficient” than authority 
deriving its legitimacy from well-established rules (Coleman 1990; Langlois 
1998). We return to this point below. 
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  Therefore, five organizational characteristics of the voluntary Debian 
Project stand out. 
•  There is no profit motive driving the organization. 
•  There is no contractual employment relationship. 
•  The “out” mechanism of contributors from the Project is self-selected 
as in a traditional market reality: factually, there is complete self-
selection. 
•  The “in” mechanism of contributors to the Project is as in a traditional 
corporate reality. In other words, a developer who wishes to 
contribute cannot do so automatically, but will be selected by Debian: 
there is only partial self-selection. 
•  Debian presents elements of formal and informal 
hierarchy/authority. 
  It is clear that these characteristics render voluntary FS/OSS 
organization uncommon. From the perspective of the present argument, 
however, the most interesting organizational characteristic is the last. 
4 / The Problem of Economic Organization 
The problem of economic organization emerges when there is a need to 
coordinate different human capabilities and comparative advantages to 
accomplish a variety of tasks in order to achieve an end. As such, the first 
problem is the discovery of different comparative advantages and human 
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capabilities so as to organize them in a productive fashion (Knight 1967[1933], 
pp. 6 and 17). 
  Discovering knowledge differences or similarities and making use of 
them in order to pursue one’s ends is however not costless. Knowledge search 
is expensive. Because knowledge is dispersed, the organizational problem does 
not usually have a cheap and easy solution. Ideally – think of the market – the 
“first-best solution” to the problem would result in the coincidence (or 
collocation) of productive knowledge and rights to act on that knowledge in 
the same hands. As in the case of Mohamed and the mountain whereby 
Mohamed could go to the mountain or the mountain to Mohamed, there are 
two ways we could achieve a solution to this problem. We could let capability 
move to those who have the rights to act; or, we could let rights to act move to 
those with capability. The perfect migration, as it were, of knowledge to rights 
and rights to knowledge is possible only in markets, for in firms perfect 
alienation of rights does not exist. A worker in a firm cannot sell (or exchange) 
his or her job (the employment bundle of rights) or the machinery he or she 
works with to someone else and capture proceeds from such alienation; 
similarly, the worker’s capability does not always match his or her assigned 
task. Free entry and exit in a firm is in fact limited by its rules, which are not 
based on voluntary exchange of rights (Jensen and Meckling 1992; Garzarelli 
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2004)23. And hierarchy (no matter how thick or well-defined) is one 
manifestation of this. 
  Take for instance the agency problem, one of the most influential 
justifications for the existence of the firm (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz 1972). The 
problem to solve in this account is that of finding the efficient management of 
agents through time. Since the firm entails team production in which final 
output is not divisible in terms of individual input, it is impossible to control 
shirking. We thus have externalities that can only be governed by delegating 
production control to a principal. But who supervises the principal? By 
granting the principal the status of residual claimant, one solves the problem of 
the principal’s incentives. We obtain in this fashion the classical capitalist firm 
presenting an acceptable amount of shirking. 
  In voluntary FS/OSS production, we saw, agency is not much of a 
problem because people are self-motivated. When there are a large number of 
potential agents, one can in fact solve the principal-agent problem by self-
selected sorting as in Debian. That is to say that one lets agents be aligned with 
the problems they are most inclined to solve anyway – in a way, one strives to 
let people be their own principals. And if many constituents of the same 
organization are at once principals and agents, then they to a large extent also 
                                                 
23 See Gifford (1991) and Vanberg (1992) for how firm and market can be distinguished by their different 
rules. Chester Barnard and Philip Selznick may have been the first to focus on the constitutional element 
of organizations (see Langlois 1998). Alchian’s (1977[1965], pp. 137-9) distinction between private and 
public ownership rights is also germane. 
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share the same rights, and this leaves, all other things constant, little room for a 
shirking justification of hierarchy.
24 
  Consider next the market versus hierarchy approach to the boundaries 
of the firm (Williamson, e.g., 1991), arguably the most sophisticated attempt to 
formalize (or “operationalize,” as Williamson put it in several contributions) 
the ideas presented by Coase (1937). Putting matters at their simplest, in this 
approach a transaction that is characterized by high asset specificity is 
considered to be in the domain of hierarchy, whereas a transaction with low 
asset specificity is considered to be in the domain of market. Asset specificity 
fundamentally refers to the lack of fungibility of some tangible and intangible 
productive assets. 
  Asset specificity opens the door to opportunistic behavior, namely, the 
attempt to maximize profit (and possibly utility) through guile. When because 
of asset specificity there arises the possibility of opportunistic behavior by at 
least one party engaged in a transaction, there also exists a probability of lock-
in to a sterile bilateral monopoly situation that may lead to a tussle for 
Marshallian quasi-rents (cf. Alchian and Woodward 1988, pp. 67ff.). When this 
is the case – and this is the crucial point – traditional market contracts are not 
sufficient to protect against opportunistic behavior, and this can lead to vertical 
                                                 
24 For instance, Eric Raymond, hacker and author of the very influential open source “manifesto” The 
Cathedral and the Bazaar (2001), writes: “the poor beleaguered conventional manager is not going to get any 
[succour] from the monitoring issue; the strongest argument the open source community has is that 
decentralized peer review trumps all the conventional methods for trying to ensure that details don’t get 
slipped” (p. 59, original emphasis). 
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integration (also called by Williamson hierarchy or intentional governance 
structure) (cf. Klein et al. 1978). 
  The bottom line of this approach is to create asymmetric rights among 
parties transacting among technologically separable interfaces: transaction cost 
theory substitutes the familiar technological and production marginal cost 
calculation with a marginal cost calculation of devising, executing, and 
supervising task completion. As a result, the distinction between hierarchical 
and nonhierarchical organization is here solved by asset specificity 
considerations: the nonhierarchical structure (market) is the residual of the 
transaction-cost calculation done within the hierarchical structure (firm). 
  Voluntary FS/OSS organization does not seem to present transactions 
with high specificity: software is supple and easy to reorganize compared to, 
say, automobile construction where the process of production involves 
machinery with high specificity, such as dies. Computers too are highly 
fungible.25 Or, more precisely, the specific assets in FS/OSS production are 
mostly knowledge (different capabilities or skill levels) and spare time.26 But, in 
the main, these specifities are both self-selective: knowledge “enters” its most 
valued use spontaneously when it desires, and it “exits” in exactly the same 
                                                 
25 In fact, software and computers are General Purpose Technologies (GPTs) (Helpman and Trajtenberg 
1998). This does not at the same time mean that the relationship between low transaction cost and GPT is 
necessarily one-to-one – but this impression requires further investigation. 
26 Take note that knowledge and spare time specificities are not generally incompatible with Williamson’s 
(1991, p. 281) “human and temporal specificities.” But, as pointed out before long, Williamson’s categories 
of specificity can be considered as a subset of the ones considered here since they deal with static 
scenarios (with transaction cost as the friction of economic systems in the Arrovian sense) –  hence they 
are not always sufficient conditions for hierarchy. Cf. Langlois and Robertson (1995) and the Fisher body 
symposium in the April 2000 issue of the Journal of Law and Economics 43(1). 
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fashion, “marginalizing” lock-in scenarios. This is possible because 
programmers share a common knowledge base. The knowledge sharing 
assures that the “checks and balances” in the process of production are 
implemented by knowledge externalities, a way to communicate behavior and 
reputation of programmers. It would consequently be irrational to act 
opportunistically if one hopes to stay in the trade and possibly advance in 
“rank.” The same logic applies if a volunteer is in the trade for so-called career 
concerns, i.e., in order to get a better paying job later on (cf. Lerner and Tirole 
2002). 
  Let us now also briefly consider a third approach to economic 
organization that derives its positive heuristic from both previous accounts: the 
“property right” (Hart, e.g., 1996). In this incentive-based theory, the firm is a 
collection of assets the incomplete contract structure of which generates two 
types of rights: specific and residual. As their names imply, specific rights are 
those that can be more or less defined; while the residual ones are not 
predefined. Here, the problem to solve is the wealth-maximizing allocation of 
residual rights. As in Williamson, when there’s fungibility of assets problems of 
opportunism are nonexistent. If the opposite situation prevails, then the most 
“efficient” course of action is to assign ownership of (tangible nonhuman) 
assets to one party. The party who will be the owner will be the one who will 
maximize the joint rents deriving from integration. The issue of the firm 
boundaries, in other words, is one of ownership: the allocation of property 
rights falls into the hands of those who are the most efficient investors. 
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Consequently, when there’s a reallocation of property rights, there’s also a 
change in incentives to invest. We thus have a precise theory of the boundaries 
between hierarchical and nonhierarchical organization that incorporates the 
insights of agency and transaction cost theories: authority is necessary because 
– given incomplete contracts – there’s a necessity to efficiently allocate residual 
rights of control in order to generate and maintain incentives for cooperation 
among parties. 
  Analogously to its inspiring agency and transaction-cost approaches, the 
property right theory does not seem to capture the essence of voluntary 
FS/OSS production. Basically, in FS/OSS there are no assets to own – or rather, 
no one is allowed to appropriate anything. Or, to make the same point through 
a different framework, we don’t have a commons or an anticommons tragedy 
in voluntary FS/OSS production that needs to be governed for there is no 
ownership problem.27 
  A voluntary FS/OSS regime such as the Debian slips through the 
meshes of some traditional organizational theories like a ghostly anomaly. As 
we saw, voluntary FS/OSS production stands the organizational problem on 
its head: it solves the problem of organization by freely allowing rights to go to 
capability as well as capability to go to rights. This freedom reduces search 
                                                 
27 A tragedy of the commons arises when inefficient specification of property rights leads to an 
overutilization of resources (think of fisheries and oil exploitation), and in the extreme to their exhaustion. 
The tragedy of the anticommons is instead the symmetric case. That is, property rights are so meticulously 
specified as to practically create no productive use of resources: anyone can block someone else’s resource 
exploitation (to use an imagery of legal doctrine, imagine that everyone possesses the rights to an essential 
facility but all deny access). Generally see the recent Buchanan and Yoon (2000), and cf., more specifically, 
Benkler (2002), which introduces the model of “commons-based peer production.” 
25  
costs, and to a large extent renders the organization of the source code and that 
of the programmers the same problem.28 
  We would seem to have, in different terms, a “best of all possible 
worlds” scenario – as is often more or less explicitly assumed in neoclassical 
production theory29 – where process of production and outcome of production 
coincide. If knowledge about output is isomorphic to the organization of its 
input, then we would expect hierarchy to disappear. But if this may be true in a 
static context – as the theories of our pageant above would ultimately imply – it 
need not necessarily be true in a (seldom-considered) dynamic context. 
  Simply put, a dynamic context is one foremost characterized by 
innovation and mistake-ridden learning. One often forgets that it is the 
combinatorics of heterogeneous productive knowledge (or capabilities) that 
leads to such characteristics. In voluntary FS/OSS this is a fortiori so given also 
that in a free/open organizational architecture heterogeneity of knowledge to a 
large extent coincides with equal rights of decision and alienation. This sets off 
greater experimentation and variety – hence greater innovation potential. And 
as articulated perhaps in the most parsimonious fashion by Radner (1992), in 
such uncertain environment rests a solid rationale for hierarchy (and authority) 
as well. 
  Viewed differently, organization – or, if you like, instances of 
nonmodularity, namely, the partitioning of alienation rights from decision 
                                                 
28 Cf. Torvalds (1999, p. 108). 
29 See Winter’s (1982) already-classic statement. 
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rights – also comes about for managing various types of interactions among 
capabilities and innovation. Indeed, organization and technology often 
coevolve: the substantive content of the capabilities that compose organization 
pushes innovation; and innovation pushes organization to diversify its 
capability base.30 When modularity is present organizational boundaries not 
only change thanks to their internal coevolution, but also thanks to their 
external coevolution generated by their high degree of porosity. And, to 
maintain organizational coherence or stability, coevolution needs its 
governance structure, too. (More on this in the next section.) 
  The problem of economic organization then has two facets: static and 
dynamic. And although with its emphasis on incentive conflicts, hazardous 
and inefficient transactions, and practically perfect production knowledge the 
static facet has attracted considerably more attention, both facets have but only 
one solution: hierarchy.31 Indeed, with learning effects and growth in the extent 
of the market (i.e., as capabilities diffuse), one could quite convincingly make 
the case that hierarchical solutions in static contexts are nothing more than a 
subset or a path-dependent manifestation of hierarchical solutions in dynamic 
ones (Langlois, e.g., 1995). 
  One implication of this is to see transaction cost in less static terms, that 
is, as a cost that also foremost arises from heterogeneous knowledge (Dahlman, 
e.g., 1980, pp. 79ff.). We may think of this type of transaction cost as the cost of, 
                                                 
30 On coevolution see for example the recent Nelson and Sampat (2001). 
31 However, compare Williamson’s work until 1975, and the more recent Williamson (1999). 
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e.g., bargaining with, coordinating with, organizing, informing, teaching, and 
persuading others. In light of this, capabilities and transactions – production 
and exchange – become indissoluble, if orthogonal (Langlois and Robertson 
1995). 
5 / Software Programming as Dynamic Organization 
The reason for the persistence of some (formal or informal) hierarchy (or 
authority/guidance/principal) in such projects as Debian therefore lies in the 
costs tied to the advantages of free/open organization. And these costs (that 
are more than outweighed by benefits) must concern, we believe, transactions 
coupled to capability reorganization in a dynamic production context. It is now 
incumbent on us to identify the locus of these costs. 
  Software programming is generally not an easy task. It presents a high 
degree of uncertainty. For example, not only does it involve the mere creation 
of code, but often also the aspect of making the code compatible with other 
codes. This is particularly true in more recent times as computers (even those 
using different operating systems) have become increasingly networked. The 
necessity to render programs compatible entails that software undergo more 
changes than traditional knowledge-intensive products. Thus new problems 
are always emerging, necessitating wide scope for testing of multiple solutions. 
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This naturally leads to a substantial amount of experimentation and to a need 
to frequently coordinate trial-and-error learning.32 
  To overcome this “complexity constraint” (Baetjer 1998, p. 32) – i.e., to 
allow for experimentation and learning among different solutions – programs, 
especially modern ones of the object-oriented type, are organized into different, 
interacting modules. It is thus possible to change a part of a module or an 
entire module without knowing all information about the program that the 
module belongs to and without altering other modules or the overall purpose 
of the program. In a context of frequent and rapid change such as the software 
one, this allows for the coordination of disparate software codes, or, if you like, 
for the coordination of disparate knowledge structures, and therefore for the 
coordination of learning. The testimony of Linus Torvalds (1999, p. 108, 
original emphasis), creator and principal software architect of Linux, is in this 
regard most eloquent. 
With the Linux kernel it became clear very quickly that we want to 
have a system [that] is as modular as possible. The [FS/OSS] 
development model really requires this, because otherwise you can’t 
easily have people working in parallel. It’s too painful when you 
have people working on the same part of the kernel and they clash. 
Without modularity I would have to check every file that changed, 
which would be a lot, to make sure nothing was changed that would 
effect anything else. With modularity, when someone sends me 
patches to do a new filesystem and I don’t necessarily trust the 
patches per se, I can still trust the fact that if nobody’s using this 
filesystem, it’s not going to impact anything else. … The key is to 
keep people from stepping on each other’s toes. 
                                                 
32 On coordination of trial-and-error learning, see especially Nelson and Winter (1977) and Langlois 
(1992). 
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  Thanks to its modular structure a program hides information among 
modules while at the same time allowing for their communication – this 
principle is known as information hiding (Parnas 1972).33 Parnas et al. (1985, p. 
260) say that according to this principle “system details that are likely to 
change independently should be the secrets of separate modules; the only 
assumptions that should appear in the interfaces between modules are those 
that are considered unlikely to change.” Information hiding assures that 
software is extendible, compatible and reusable. In actual programming 
practice, it is a very efficient way to reduce the appearance of bugs. Information 
hiding moreover suggests that the primary benchmark to assess the efficiency 
of a particular software is not so much the ability to perform tasks as the ability 
to evolve to potentially perform tasks even better (Baetjer 1998). 
  Information hiding is a principle that actually derives from a more 
general characteristic of modularity known as encapsulation. “Encapsulation of 
information,” assert Mark S. Miller and K. Eric Drexel in “Markets and 
Computation: Agoric Open Systems,” a classic contribution on the (Hayekian 
and Coasean) economic properties of computation, 
ensures that one object cannot directly read or tamper with the 
contents of another; communication enables objects to exchange 
information by mutual consent. The encapsulation and 
communication of access ensures that communication rights are 
similarly controlled and transferable only by mutual consent. These 
properties correspond to elements of traditional object-oriented 
programming practice; in large systems, they facilitate local 
reasoning about competence issues – about what computations the 
                                                 
33 But compare Brooks (1975, pp. 78ff.). 
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system can perform. Extending encapsulation to include 
computational resources means holding each object accountable for 
the cost of its activity ... . In large systems, these extensions facilitate 
local reasoning about performance issues – about the time and 
resources consumed in performing a given computation. … 
[Encapsulation] establishes protected spheres in which [individuals] 
can plan the use of their resources free of interference from 
unpredictable external influences. This enables [planning and 
acting] despite the limited, local nature of most knowledge; it thus 
permits more effective use of divided knowledge, aiding the 
division of labor. The value of protected spheres and local 
knowledge has thus far been the sole motivation for giving software 
modules ‘property rights’ through encapsulation. … Encapsulation 
and communication of resources correspond to ownership and 
voluntary transfer, the basis of trade. … [M]otivated by the need for 
decentralized planning and division of labor, computer science has 
reinvented the notion of property rights (Miller and Drexel 1988, 
original emphasis).34 
Encapsulation – which we may liken to division of labor and specialization 
benefits arising from the clear definition of property rights – is therefore 
fundamental for the software production process: the clear separation of mine 
from thine through the creation of common standards is the cradle of program 
evolution.35 
 Encapsulation  favors  speciation (Houthakker 1994[1956]) along many 
dimensions. Speciation occurs not just in the space of final output, but also in 
the spaces of interrelations among the modules and of inputs.36 Essentially, by 
                                                 
 
34 All references to this article are to the webbed version. 
35 In his classic discussion of property rights, Alchian (1977[1965], p. 140, original emphasis) highlighted 
the following benefits of property encapsulation: “(1) concentration of rewards and costs more directly on 
each person responsible for them, and (2) comparative advantage effects of specialized applications of (a) 
knowledge in control and (b) of risk bearing.” Langlois (2002) has just developed a full-blown modular 
theory of organization and technology on encapsulation. 
36 Speciation hence encompasses so-called forking in software as a special case. This is so for two reasons: 
first, speciation is not always negative as is forking in software, it refers also to, e.g., innovation, 
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allowing capabilities to go to their most valued use without necessarily 
resorting to fiat one allows more room for variety. Encapsulation is a way to 
assure that those who have the capability to perform modifications to 
programs are assured the rights to do so (cf. Benkler 2002; Garzarelli 2004). As 
many have shown (e.g., Langlois 1992; Langlois and Robertson 1995, Ch. 5; 
Arora et al. 1997; Baldwin and Clark 1997), this is the opposite competitive 
trend to closed, proprietary systems. 
  It is thanks to encapsulation that a modular system is able to generate 
what Garud and Kumaraswamy (1995) have called “economies of 
substitution”: thanks to its free/open nature, a modular system captures not 
only capabilities that would be present in internal organization, but potentially 
all those dispersed in the economy. Through economies of substitution it is 
possible for a number of dispersed organizations or individuals to enjoy cost 
advantages in production because it is not always necessary to create or search 
for appropriate capabilities within the organizational boundaries; rather, the 
capabilities often converge to the production process from outside 
organizational boundaries through, as it were, their own volition. Alongside 
the market (Hayek 1945, Chs. 2 and 4; cf. also Raymond 2001), modular 
organization appears to be the other “distributed environment” (Halpern and 
Moses 1990) that exploits the comparative advantage of encapsulation to the 
fullest. 
                                                                                                                                              
improvement, etc.; second, as we just noted, speciation refers not only to final output as does forking. For 
a definition of forking, visit: ‹http://people.kldp.org/~eunjea/jargon/?idx=forked›. 
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    Still, the benefits emerging thanks to the clear definition of property 
rights have their overhead. That is to say that in attempting to dominate the 
complexity constraint one is inevitably bound to other constraints. 
 Modularity  decreases  internal coordination costs. An internal coordination 
cost is one that emerges when an individual tries to coordinate a number of his 
or her own activities simultaneously. But thanks to division of labor internal 
coordination costs decline – e.g., individuals specialize, there are no switching 
costs from changing tasks, we focus on one task at the time, programmers 
usually participate to the project they desire, etc. At the same time modularity 
also creates external coordination costs. An external coordination cost is one tied 
to, e.g., experimentation, learning, and innovation benefits. For example, it 
refers to the cost of coordinating a large number of specialized programmers 
simultaneously working on the same patch. But at base, an external 
coordination costs is an overhead deriving from decreasing internal 
coordination costs (Houthakker 1994[1956]). 
  This ineluctable trade-off between internal and external coordination 
costs originates for cognitive reasons.37 Hierarchy emerges as a necessity to 
                                                 
 
37 In fact, Houthakker (1994[1956], p. 62) uses a parallel with the human brain. “The indivisibility of the 
individual consists in the fact that, although it may be capable of a great many different activities, it can 
perform only few activities simultaneously because most activities utilize the same resources and more 
particularly that coordinating resource which is known as the brain. The larger the number of 
simultaneous activities, the greater the difficulty of coordinating them and of carrying out each one 
properly, and the smaller therefore the output from each activity. This applies not only to simultaneous 
activities, but also to activities that are spread out over time. In the first place some shorter or longer 
interval is usually needed to switch from one activity to another; in the second place it is usually easier to 
perform activities that are known from previous experience than to perform them for the first time. All 
this, the economist will note at once, can be put in terms of increasing returns. We have increasing returns 
to the extent that, if a single one replaces several activities, there is less need for coordination and 
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manage the uncertainty generated by economies of substitution. As observed a 
moment ago, this uncertainty refers not only to speciation in input and output, 
but also to speciation (and interactions) in the organization of multiple inputs 
working in parallel, of multiple parallel modular outputs, and of total output. 
In the case of software some form of management of innovation is necessary to 
guarantee, e.g., product integrity and modular compatibility. 
  In view of this, we may interpret hierarchy in voluntary FS/OSS 
organization as nothing more than the attempt to balance – to search for an 
equilibrium? – the number of contributors and the number of software 
contributions accepted. The Debian Constitution, with its clearly defined 
division of competences, is a concrete illustration of an attempt to create this 
balance through a formal hierarchy. 
  More generally, a constitution – designed abstract rules of conduct – is a 
self-imposed constraint (an external coordination cost) grounded on the belief 
that there are times when transacting parties have an opportunity to improve 
their welfare, as well as possibly that of others, by not only making the rules of 
the game explicit, but also by credibly following them. It is a means to promote 
specialization because allowing for too much flexibility in action can be 
equivalent to limiting the ability of others to plan their own purposive action.38 
                                                                                                                                              
switching time and more scope for acquiring experience. The output of the single activity may thus be 
raised above the combined outputs of the several activities.” 
38 Compare Buchanan (1999[1990], esp. pp. 380-1), Gifford (1991), Vanberg (1992), and Langlois (1998). 
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  Constitutional constraints are arguably a very effective way to manage 
routine change, viz., change that does not have a vast impact on existing 
structure of production. In other words, the incomplete-contract nature of a 
constitution allows adaptation especially to change that is of a routine type. 
The dynamic perspective to organization, however, places equal importance on 
the coordination of change that is not routine. Indeed, organization form – itself 
not a constant in any moment in time – is lato sensu a function of the nature of 
the change that needs managing. 
  The most immediate way to get a sense of the argument is probably still 
in terms of Teece’s (1986) distinction between autonomous and systemic 
innovation. An innovation is said to be autonomous if it is easily adaptable to 
the existing process of production, viz., if it just requires autonomous changes 
in one stage of production. In these cases the management of innovation is 
easier, and thus organization may require little special coordination efforts 
(where the most extreme example of this would be the market). An innovation 
is conversely systemic if it requires simultaneous changes in multiple stages of 
production. The higher uncertainty tied to the coordination of a systemic 
innovation tips the balance in favor of a more hierarchical/authoritarian 
organization: centralized direction lowers new transaction costs emerging from 
the rearrangement of complementary stages of production (Silver 1984; 
Langlois and Robertson 1995). 
  One last piece of the puzzle needs to be put in place. It is in situations of 
systemic change that one is also most likely to witness the hierarchy of 
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Weberian charismatic authority (Weber 1964[1947]; Coleman 1990) supplanting 
the one of a constitution. We saw how in the case of Debian there are times 
when programmers having excellent reputation may intervene to guide the 
process of production even though they may have no formal organizational 
title. Why? As is often the case in other situations requiring urgent attention – 
think, e.g., of a war, epidemic or terrorist attack (cf. Bolton and Farrell 1990) – 
charismatic authority may be more helpful in overcoming not only multiple, 
but also high, simultaneous coordination costs. If different external 
coordination costs all interact at once to solve the same problem they may be 
all be competing with one another rather than complementing one another. 
Charismatic authority can obviate these coordination failures through its super 
partes governance structure by aligning conflicting interests. It is a case when 
programmers commit not to a complex system of rules such as a constitution, 
but to the direct authority of a charismatic programmer. This is so because 
constitutional rules may not always allow for the quickest adaptation. 
Charismatic authority can fundamentally be seen as another way to solve 
empty core problems emerging in situations of uncommon flux (e.g., 
reorganizing multiple stages of production, overseeing significant changes in 
product architecture, etc.).39 
                                                 
39 Langlois (1995, 1998). This is akin to Knight’s view of the organizational problem in situations of 
uncertainty. “When uncertainty is present and the task of deciding what to do and how to do it takes the 
ascendancy over that of execution, the internal organization of the productive groups is no longer a 
matter of indifference or a mechanical detail. … Centralization of this deciding and controlling function is 
imperative, a process of ‘cephalization,’ such as has taken place in the evolution of organic life, is 
inevitable, and for the same reasons as in the case of biological evolution” (Knight 1946[1921], III.ix.8, p. 
268). 
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  Notice that this versatility interpretation is nothing more than the 
capabilities approach to organization in another guise. As previously noted, the 
heterogeneous nature of capabilities is what defines the dynamic organization 
problem: change along multiple dimensions generated by different capabilities 
needs frequent coordination. This is one reason why organizations tend to 
specialize in activities involving similar capabilities; but production rests on the 
coordination of activities that are complementary (Richardson 1972). In dynamic 
environments, nonhierarchical organization – such as the market – may fail in 
transmitting the appropriate knowledge to solve dynamic coordination 
problems. This is so because the capabilities that need governing contain 
knowledge that goes beyond price and quantity. Given this, qualitative 
coordination is necessary. In turn, this necessarily entails hierarchy, not only 
the familiar one of firms, but also the more rare one of voluntary FS/OSS 
production. Lest the reader may misunderstand, let us underline that this is not 
a plea for planning in the sense of a command economy, but rather one for 
flexibility (Langlois, e.g., 1995).40 
                                                 
40 In fact, coherence and flexibility are not always strictly in the domain of conscious organization. 
Consider Hayek’s assertion. “There is … no reason why a polycentric order in which each element is 
guided only by rules and receives no orders from a center should not be capable of bringing about as 
complex and apparently as ‘purposive’ an adaptation to circumstances as could be produced in a system 
where a part is set aside to preform such an order on an analogue or model before it is put into execution 
by the larger structure. In so far as the self-organizing forces of a structure as a whole lead at once to the 
right kind of action (or to tentative actions which can be retracted before too much harm is done), such a 
single-stage order need not be inferior to a hierarchic one in which the whole merely carries out what has 
first been tried out in a part. Such a non-hierarchic order dispenses with the necessity of first 
communicating all the information on which its several elements act to a common center and conceivably 
may make the use of more information possible than could be transmitted to, and digested by, a center” 
(Hayek 1967, p. 74). 
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6 / Conclusion 
This work views modular production through an organizational lens that does 
not hold all cetera paria. By focusing on the governance of internal and external 
coevolutionary coordination costs, through this lens we show that hierarchy 
(even if perhaps flatter than in most other cases) exists in voluntary FS/OSS 
production to coordinate an environment subject to frequent mutation. 
  The substantive lesson is that this more explicitly dynamic reading of the 
problem of economic organization leads us to argue against what we may 
christen modularity determinism. Modularity determinism may be interpreted as 
a Panglossian offspring of organizational theories that perceive modularity in 
input and output as necessarily coinciding with pure modularity (perfect 
decomposability) in the process transforming those inputs into those outputs. 
To hold, modularity determinism requires the assumption of divisibility of 
production and exchange (or, what is the same thing, the assumption of no or 
negligible novelty). We, on the other hand, argue for indivisibility between 
capabilities and transactions. 
  To put it differently, a pure modular structure – that is, one lacking 
hierarchy, such as a market – embeds flexibility in the form of a learning 
mechanism, but it lacks coherence, the ability to coevolve after adapting to 
change (cf., e.g., Langlois 1995). Indeed, the flexibility aspect of modularity is 
what pushes organizational coherence out of synchrony – what misaligns 
expectations in the Hayekian sense. Hence, when a modular organization 
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presents coherence (and is healthy), hierarchy, we submit, is bundled to its 
modularity because of flexibility. 
  Our findings square well with those of others at the level of industry. In 
their case studies of aircraft engines and chemical plants, Brusoni and Prencipe 
(2001) for example find that modularity in product architectures is spawning a 
greater division of labor across firms. At the same time, they write, this 
increased division of labor requires greater conscious coordination in the form 
of so-called system integrator companies that must “compose” what has been 
“decomposed” (p. 195). 
  Be that as it may, the implications of modularity are still not entirely 
clear.
41 Pushing our results too far at this stage could mean facing decreasing 
returns rather quickly. We need further theoretical, empirical (qualitative and 
quantitative) and historical research. 
 
                                                 
41
 Compare for example Schilling and Steensma (2001). 
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